Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen - architect of a 'self-coup'?
(Photo Credit REUTERS)
In an article coming later this week, I will be delving into the nuances surrounding the technical and political definitions of a coup d'etat. Suffice to say, there are several different definitions of this often brutal form of power transfer, and this can cause problems for political theorists and watchers of international events. Whilst some may see such musings as simply an exercise in semantics, the importance of a definition can be crucial in the realm of international politics. Whether a transfer of power in a country is defined as a coup can directly affect the political and socio-economic circumstances that country then needs to navigate with other nations, and how far the definition is stretched can often be a matter of time, place, and perspective.
Cambodia is currently proving to be one of those definition-stretching places.
Since 1979, the now-Kingdom of Cambodia has been ruled by the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), initially as the only legal political party and then onwards as part of an ostensibly multi-party democratic system from the early 1990s. The current Prime Minister of Cambodia - and President of the CPP - is Hun Sen, who having held his position since 1985 makes him currently the world's longest-serving Prime Minister. Prior to his elevation to the Premiership of Cambodia he served as a Battalion Commander in the Khmer Rouge regime, before defecting to serve the Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea that followed the Khmer Rouge's downfall.
Opposing the CPP as the primary opposition group is - or legally speaking was - the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), headed by democratic activist and current detention centre inmate, Kem Sokha. The CNRP was formed in 2012 from a merger of two other political groups and became the main opposition group after the 2013 general election, winning 55 out of 123 seats (approximately 44%) in the National Assembly. This was the largest loss of assembly seats by the CPP in the history of Cambodia's multi-party system, and this loss occurred despite allegations from the Human Rights Watch about government-backed electoral fraud and voter intimidation. A year of ongoing protests resulted from opposition anger at the alleged irregularities, quelled eventually by the combination of a brutal government crackdown and a National Assembly power-sharing agreement that was agreed with the CNRP leadership.
With the next legislative elections scheduled to occur on 29 July 2018, the CPP stood in danger of losing its position as the dominant political party in Cambodia for the first time since multi-party democracy was introduced. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the party's history, the leadership of the CPP has elected not to go - in the words of Dylan Thomas - gently into that good night. Instead, they've arguably engaged in what some analysts call a 'self-coup'.
In February of this year, the CPP announced its intention to make it illegal for any person convicted of a criminal offence in the past five years to being able to run for political office. The political nature of this legal change is seen as being aimed at the then-leader of the CNRP, Sam Rainsy. Having been convicted in previous years of defamation against Prime Minister Hun Sen by a court system criticized for being in the pocket of the CPP, Sam Rainsy would be barred from running for Prime Minister at the head of Cambodia's only other large political party.
Sam Rainsy resigned from the leadership of the CNRP and control passed to Kem Sokha. However, on 3 September Kem Sokha was arrested on allegations of treason. The CPP accused him of being part of an American-backed plot to undermine the government. The evidence cited by the government was a four-year-old video of Kem Sokha giving a speech in which he said he had received advice from the United States on building an opposition movement. During the same time period, independent newspapers and radio stations were either closed or ordered to stop broadcasting from sources regarded as pro-American, and the National Democratic Institute - a pro-democracy non-profit organization with connections to the US Democratic Party - was expelled from the country. On 16 November, the CPP-loyalist Cambodia Supreme Court forcibly dissolved the CNRP as a legal entity, accusing it of plotting to overthrow the government.
This leaves the CPP theoretically facing no organized opposition in the 2018 elections. How these actions will be perceived by the people of Cambodia and the supporters of the CNRP remains to be seen. One of the requirements of a successful 'coup' - if the definition can be used here - is the correct reading of public opinion towards such moves. Given the previous examples of protest against the CPP and the public perception of their corruption and mismanagement, I find it doubtful that Hun Sen is correctly reading the mood of the populace regarding the prospect of continued CPP political hegemony. Protests would be unsurprising to see in the near-future, provided that activist fatigue and public fear over police brutality do not prove to be sufficient deterrents.
The more basic definitions of a coup d'etat emphasis the exercise of illegal force - often of the military kind - to usurp control of the state from a government. These definitions create difficulties in several ways, which I will be examining in my deeper analysis later this week. In the case of Cambodia, these definitions would fall short of describing the CPP's actions as a coup. This is not a situation where a small group has overthrown a sitting government, which simpler definitions highlight as being key criteria of a coup d'etat.
Whilst previous protests have been suppressed by military police - and thus theoretically meeting the requirement for 'military force' - the legality of the force used is debatable. Opposition suppression through a policy of police brutality has indeed occurred - and should indeed be condemned - but does not necessarily fall into the definition of a force-backed coup d'etat if the use of force by the Cambodian security apparatus has fallen within the 'legal' boundaries of Cambodian authority. In short, the more basic definitions of a coup would not view opposition party suppression as evidence of a coup if the means and the exercise of that suppression is undertaken legally from the perspective of Cambodia's penal code.
As I expressed at the start of this article, these are of course technicalities. The real politik of the situation in Cambodia is that a government with a history of undemocratic activities is attempting to dissolve its key political opposition using allegations based on dubious evidence. However, as I also initially expressed, these technicalities of definition can have real-life international effects. In the United States, Section 508 of the Federal Assistance Act legally bars the US Government from providing aid to "any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by decree or military coup." Indeed, by the definition of United States federal law, the actions in Cambodia are not necessarily seen legally as a coup d'etat, and even when much more obvious coups have occurred in the past - such as the military coup in Honduras in 2009 - the US Government has been reluctant to use the 'coup' label, instead finding other euphemistic terms to describe the situation.
Whether Cambodia has engaged in a 'coup' by the technical definition depends on your perspective. Whilst these discussions of nuances don't help the plight of the suppressed opposition, they are nonetheless important to address due to the far-reaching economic and political consequences that can occur from the international community seeing something as a 'coup' or as some other form of power transfer. Most plainly in recent events we see this legal concern in Zimbabwe, where a military junta is desperately trying to find an aesthetically legal manner through which to depose Robert Mugabe.
Whether Hun Sen and the CPP will care much themselves about the technicalities of their actions remains to be seen. However, I predict the practicalities of their actions may soon come back to haunt them in the months to come.